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Conjunction fallacies occur in reasoning when people 
assign a higher probability to a conjunction than to one or 
other of its constituents. In the most famous demonstra-
tion in the literature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) people 
read a description of Linda, a 31-year-old, smart, out-
spoken woman who was a philosophy major, concerned 
with discrimination and social justice, and a participant 
in antinuclear demonstrations. When asked to rank vari-
ous statements about Linda in order of their probability, 
people rank the statement “Linda is a bank teller and is 
active in the feminist movement” above the statement 
“Linda is a bank teller,” resulting in an apparent norma-
tive contradiction.
Recently, Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) have 
demonstrated a parallel conjunction fallacy in category-
based induction. The effect was demonstrated for two 
different kinds of materials: (1) category reinforcement 
arguments and (2) causal arguments (see Table 1). Both 
sets of arguments concerned related categories. The cat-
egories in Arguments 1–3 are related by virtue of a shared 
property. Accordingly, Medin et al. referred to them as 
property-reinforcement materials. However, we prefer the 
term category reinforcement materials as in each case the 
shared property (e.g., living at altitude) can be thought of 
as a categorical relation, and in many cases what is shared 
corresponds more directly to a category (e.g., cows, pigs, 
and sheep are all farm animals). The categories in Argu-
ments 4–6, on the other hand, are causally related.
Medin et al. (2003) found that, across a number of sets 
of arguments, the mean ratings of inductive strength (on a 
9-point scale) for two-conclusion category arguments, like 
1 and 4, were greater than the means for the correspond-
ing single-conclusion category arguments, like 2 and 3 
and 5 and 6. These judgments are normatively contradic-
tory, as the probability of a conjunction cannot be greater 
than the probability of its constituents, and replicate the 
general conjunction fallacy effect. Although Medin et al. 
do not systematically analyze differences between judg-
ments based on causal and categorical knowledge, differ-
ences between categorical and causal materials highlight 
the fact that the fallacy may be based on different kinds 
of knowledge about the relationships among categories. 
One important difference between these arguments is that 
whereas the relation between the premise and conclusion 
categories is the same in both single-category reinforce-
ment arguments, there are different premise–conclusion 
relations in the single causal arguments. For example, 
because mice eat grain, a property might be directly 
transmitted from grain to mice. However, because owls 
eat mice—not grain—a property is likely to be indirectly 
transmitted from grain to owls via mice. Thus, the causal 
relationship in 5 is closer than that in 6, and we refer to 
arguments like 5 as single close and to arguments like 6 
as single distant.
Although the conjunction fallacy effect is decidedly ro-
bust, applying to diverse experimental judgments based on 
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different kinds of knowledge, there appear to be individual 
differences in susceptibility to the fallacy: People who 
resist it tend to report higher SAT scores. Stanovich and 
West (1998) have explained these individual differences 
in terms of a dual-process theory of reasoning (Evans, 
2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999), which posits 
the existence of two reasoning systems: a fast, largely 
unconscious, parallel, and pragmatic System 1 working 
alongside a slower, memory-intensive, conscious, serial, 
and evolutionarily more recent System 2. Under this view, 
in cases where normatively correct task performance is 
not associated with ability, System 1 and System 2 are 
said to deliver the same, normatively correct, response. In 
cases where there is an association between performance 
and ability, the systems deliver different responses. Sys-
tem 1 is said to operate on a contextualized representa-
tion of the problem delivering the normatively incorrect 
response, and System 2 operates on a decontextual-
ized representation that abstracts away from the content 
and context of the problem to its underlying form (see 
Stanovich, 1999, pp. 169–174), thus delivering the cor-
rect response. Accordingly, participants who are higher in 
System 2 resources (i.e., cognitive ability) are more likely 
to suppress the incorrect response from System 1 in favor 
of System 2, and give the correct response based on their 
decontextualized representation of the problem.
One as-yet-unexplored possibility allowed by this ex-
planatory framework is that differences in susceptibility to 
reasoning fallacies may also arise due to the background 
knowledge that is evoked by particular content. That is, 
because it may be harder to construct a decontextualized 
representation of some problems than others, some prob-
lems may lead to higher rates of fallacious responding 
than others. At the moment, dual process theory offers 
no principled means of generating predictions about the 
ease with which decontextualized representations may be 
constructed in different knowledge domains.
In the category-based induction literature, research 
has suggested that causal and categorical knowledge are 
treated differently, and intriguingly suggests that knowl-
edge effects may also be qualified by individual differ-
ences. For example, Rehder (2006) has investigated the 
robustness, in the presence of causal knowledge, of typi-
cality and diversity, two classic effects in category-based 
reasoning that are indicative of categorically organized 
knowledge. In one experimental trial, participants learned 
about Kehoe ants and were asked about their willingness 
to project a property from specific exemplars to the entire 
class of Kehoe ants. The property was either blank, such 
as having choroidal parasites attached to its eyes, or caus-
ally related to known features of Kehoe ants (e.g., hav-
ing a stinging venomous bite, which is caused by a high 
concentration of iron sulphate, a preexisting property of 
Kehoe ants).
Rehder (2006) observed significantly greater typical-
ity and diversity effects in the blank property condition 
than in the causal condition: When causal knowledge was 
available, participants preferred to generalize based on the 
causal relations among features. However, an individual 
differences analysis revealed two patterns of responding, 
one group that relied primarily on causal knowledge and 
the other that relied primarily on categorical knowledge, 
though no explanation of the origin of the individual dif-
ferences was offered. When considered in the context 
of studies with real-world concepts (e.g., Lopez, Atran, 
Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997; Shafto & Coley, 2003), 
the results suggest that causal knowledge is preferred as 
a basis for inductive inference, but leave unresolved the 
cause of individual differences in the use of causal and 
categorical knowledge.
Combining the literatures on conjunction fallacies and 
category-based induction, we see two factors that may affect 
whether the conjunction fallacy is observed in category- 
based induction: (1) cognitive ability, and (2) relationships 
among categories in an argument. Consequently, our goals 
in this study are, first, to replicate the conjunction fal-
lacy effects in category-based reasoning demonstrated by 
Medin et al. (2003) for both causal and categorical knowl-
Table 1 
Arguments Used to Demonstrate Category Reinforcement 
and Causal Conjunction Fallacies
Category Reinforcement Arguments
1. Two category
Andean people have property X12
Therefore, Himalayan people and Alpine people have property X12
2. Single category
Andean people have property X12
Therefore, Himalayan people have property X12
3. Single category
Andean people have property X12
Therefore, Alpine people have property X12
Causal Arguments
4. Two category
Grain has property M4
Therefore, Mice and Owls have property M4
5. Single close
Grain has property M4
Therefore, Mice have property M4
6. Single distant
Grain has property M4
Therefore, Owls have property M4
Note—Adapted from Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003).
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edge. Second, we attempt to replicate findings regarding 
individual differences in susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy (Stanovich & West, 1998). On the basis of previous 
research, we expect people with higher cognitive ability 
to be less susceptible to the fallacy. Third, we ask whether 
conjunction fallacies based on causal knowledge are more 
frequent than those based on categorical knowledge. This 
last possibility comes from Rehder’s  (2006) finding that, 
for the majority of participants evaluating category-based 
inductive arguments, causal relations are a more compel-
ling source of information than taxonomic relations.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 114 female and 16 male undergraduates at the Univer-
sity of Durham participated in this experiment.
Materials and Design
Each participant completed the AH4 (Heim, 1970), a widely used 
group test of cognitive ability.1 Participants also completed a reason-
ing questionnaire comprising 18 conjunction fallacy by category 
reinforcement arguments and 18 causal conjunction fallacy argu-
ments. Some of these arguments are taken from Medin et al. (2003). 
However, the majority of the arguments are of our own devising. 
Each group of 18 arguments was made up of six sets, each contain-
ing 3 arguments, two whose conclusion concerned a single category, 
and a third whose conclusion concerned both of the categories de-
scribed in the conclusion of the first two arguments.
An example set of category reinforcement arguments follows:
Pasta has property X13.
How likely is it that rice and potatoes have property X13?
Pasta has property X13.
How likely is it that potatoes have property X13?
Pasta has property X13.
How likely is it that rice has property X13?
The causal conjunction fallacy materials were presented in a similar 
fashion. For all arguments, participants were asked to make their 
strength judgments on 9-point likert scales ranging from 1 (very 
unlikely) to 9 (very likely). Note that, unlike Medin et al., we used 
the same blank property in all three arguments in a set. All 36 argu-
ments in the booklet were presented in one of four different random 
orders.
Procedure
The cognitive ability and reasoning data were collected from par-
ticipants on two separate occasions in lectures.
RESULTS
Scores on the AH4 ranged from 46 to 122. The mean 
overall score was 94.6 (SD  14.3), close to the norm for 
this type of sample (M  96.4, SD  15.0). We coded par-
ticipants as high or low in ability. Participants who scored 
95 or less were coded as low (N  64), whereas all other 
participants were coded high (N  66). The mean ability 
score for the low group was 83.1 (SD  11.0), whereas the 
mean score for the high group was 105.7 (SD  5.9).
Conjunction Fallacy by Category Reinforcement
For the purposes of the analysis that follows, in each set 
we coded the single-category-conclusion arguments that 
had received the highest mean rating as single strong and 
the other as single weak. We coded a set as displaying sen-
sitivity to the fallacy if the strength rating attributed to the 
two-category conclusion argument was greater than that 
assigned to either of the single-category-conclusion argu-
ments. In Table 2, these data are broken down by phenom-
enon type and item. Overall, participants were susceptible 
to the fallacy on 47% of category reinforcement trials. 
We observed a negative association between the propor-
tion of cases in which participants displayed the fallacy on 
Table 2 
Percentage of Participants Displaying the Fallacy, Mean Ratings of Inductive Strength, and  
Standard Deviations, Broken Down by Phenomenon Type, Problem Set, and Argument
Argument Ratings
 
Two Category
Single Strong/
Single Close
Single Weak/
Single Distant
Phenomenon Type and Problem Set  % Susceptible*  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD
Category Reinforcement
 Cabbage/lettuce, spinach 56 5.0 1.9 4.7 2.0 4.5 1.9
 Cows/pigs, sheep 48 4.1 1.9 3.9 1.7 3.8 1.8
 Pasta/potatoes, rice 45 4.7 2.2 4.7 2.1 4.4 2.1
 Polish people/Czech people, Ukrainian people 45 4.4 2.1 4.3 2.0 4.1 1.9
 Andean people/Alpine people, Himalayan people 44 4.3 2.1 4.3 2.0 3.9 1.9
 Brown bears/panda bears, polar bears 42 4.6 2.1 4.8 2.0 4.6 2.0
 Overall 47 4.5 4.4 4.2
Causal
 Soil/grass, cows 62 4.7 2.2 5.5 2.1 3.5 1.9
 Sheep/wool, sweaters 61 5.5 2.3 5.9 2.1 4.3 2.2
 Lead/pipes, plumbers 51 3.3 2.0 5.4 2.3 2.5 1.8
 Cows/milk, ice cream 49 5.4 2.1 6.1 2.1 4.6 2.0
 Grain/mice, owls 44 3.8 2.1 4.1 2.2 3.1 1.9
 Sea water/cod, sharks** 33 – – –
 Overall 50 4.5 5.1 3.9
*% Susceptible refers to the proportion of participants who rated the two-category conclusion argument stronger than at least one of the single-
category-conclusion arguments. **We excluded this set from the analysis of strength ratings. In the order they would have appeared in the table, 
the mean ratings for the arguments in this set are 4.5, 4.8, and 4.5.
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the category reinforcement stimuli and their scores on the 
AH4 [r(130)  =.21, p  .02]. That is, participants who 
did poorly on the AH4 were more likely to be susceptible 
to the fallacy.
Mean ratings of argument strength, broken down by 
item and argument, are shown in Table 2. The results of a 
2 (ability)  3 (argument: two category, single strong, and 
single weak)  6 (set) ANOVA contained a significant 
main effect of argument [F(2,256)  12.81, MSe  1.53, 
p  .001]. This main effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction between argument and ability [F(2,256)  
5.11, MSe  1.53, p  .01]. The means involved in this 
interaction are displayed in Figure 1.
Planned comparisons revealed that the low group at-
tributed significantly greater strength to two-category ar-
guments than to either single weak ( p  .001) or single 
strong ( p  .05) arguments. For the high group, strength 
ratings for the two-category arguments did not differ sig-
nificantly from strength ratings for either weak or strong 
single-category arguments.
The results of the ANOVA contained a significant main 
effect of set [F(5,640)  9.40, MSe  4.42, p  .001], but 
the interaction between set and argument was not signifi-
cant [F(10,1280)  1.14, MSe  1.19, p  .33]. Exami-
nation of the means in Table 2 reveals that, whereas the 
mean for the single weak argument was never greater than 
the mean for the two category argument, the size of the 
difference between these means varied considerably be-
tween sets. Post hoc tests revealed that the difference was 
significant for four out of six sets. For the Poles set, the 
difference was marginal ( p  .06), but for the bears set, 
the two-category conclusion ratings—although slightly 
greater than those for one of the other arguments—were 
not significantly so.
Causal Conjunction Fallacy
The item involving sea water, cod, and sharks produced 
relatively low levels of susceptibility to the fallacy (see 
Table 2). One reason for this discrepancy may be that 
there are independent routes for causal transmission from 
seawater to cod and from seawater to sharks. Thus, cod 
and sharks may be an equal causal distance from seawater. 
Accordingly, we did not include this item in any of the 
analysis that follows.
Excluding this item, participants were susceptible to 
the causal conjunction fallacy on 53% of trials. However, 
more prevalent than susceptibility to the fallacy was use of 
the causal distance between the premise category and the 
conclusion category as a cue to argument strength. This 
was particularly true for the single close arguments. On 
81% of trials, participants rated these arguments stronger 
than the two-category argument. By contrast, participants 
rated the single distant argument stronger than the two-
category argument on only 50% of trials.
In contrast with our findings with the category rein-
forcement materials, there was little evidence that higher 
ability participants are more able to resist the causal 
conjunction fallacy. The negative association between 
susceptibility to the fallacy and ability was nonsignifi-
cant [r(130)  =.09, p  .3]. There was some evidence 
of individual differences in the tendency to use causal 
knowledge. The tendency to rate the single close argu-
ment stronger than the two-category argument was asso-
ciated with ability [r(130)  .22, p  .02]. High-ability 
participants rated the Close argument stronger than the 
two-category argument on 85% of occasions, whereas for 
low-ability participants, this figure was 77.5% [t(128)  
2.30, p  .03].
A 2 (ability)  3 (argument)  5 (set) ANOVA on mean 
ratings of argument strength for the causal conjunction 
fallacy materials revealed significant main effects of all 
three variables. The significant main effect of ability 
[F(1,128)  4.59, MSe  23.44, p  .04] was due to the 
low group’s giving significantly higher ratings of induc-
tive strength (M  4.7) than did high participants (M  
4.3). However, neither the interaction between ability and 
argument [F(2,256)  1] (see Figure 1), nor the three-way 
interaction [F(8,1024)  1.30, MSe  1.86, p  .24] was 
significant.
There was a significant main effect of argument 
[F(2,256)  105.32, MSe  2.31, p  .001], which was 
qualified by a significant interaction between argument 
and set [F(8,1024)  152.69, MSe  1.86, p  .001]. The 
means involved in this interaction are presented in Table 2. 
Post hoc tests revealed that, for all sets, ratings for the two-
conclusion argument were significantly greater than the 
Figure 1. Mean argument strength ratings broken down by 
ability and argument for (A) category reinforcement materials 
and (B) causal materials.
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ratings for the single distant argument, and significantly 
lower than those for the single close arguments. The inter-
action is due to variation in the size of these differences.
Comparing Conjunction Fallacies
A paired samples t test revealed that susceptibility to 
the conjunction fallacy was greater with causal materi-
als than with category reinforcement materials [t(129)  
2.99, p  .005]. We also carried out a 2 (fallacy)  2 
(ability)  2 (strength) mixed design ANOVA on the 
mean difference between ratings for each of the single-
category arguments and ratings for the two-conclusion 
argument. For the purposes of this analysis, we collapsed 
across sets. In Figure 2, we present the means involved in 
the nonsignificant [F(1,128)  1], three-way interaction 
from that analysis. Single sample t tests on the means in-
volved revealed that, with the exception of the difference 
scores produced by high-ability participants for category 
reinforcement materials, all scores differed significantly 
from 0. An examination of Figure 2 reveals that, although 
there was, overall, no conjunction fallacy for the causal 
close arguments, the biggest conjunction fallacy was found 
for the causal distant arguments. Notably, high- and low- 
ability participants appear to treat the causal arguments 
in a similar fashion. However, for the category reinforce-
ment materials, only low-ability participants are suscep-
tible to the fallacy.
DISCUSSION
We have replicated Medin et al.’s (2003) finding of a 
conjunction fallacy in category-based induction. Our re-
sults suggest that people are somewhat more susceptible 
to the causal version of the fallacy than to the category- 
reinforcement version. However, in interpreting this result, 
it should be borne in mind that we used a relatively small 
number of items, the causal and category-reinforcement 
materials were different, and so may have differed in diffi-
culty, and we excluded one of the causal items from further 
analysis. Further research is required before we can make 
strong claims about differences in susceptibility to differ-
ent versions of the fallacy. Nonetheless, we have found 
strong evidence that participants used causal knowledge 
when evaluating causal arguments. We have also observed 
that the causal conjunction fallacy differs from the fallacy 
that is obtained by category reinforcement. There was a 
significant relationship between ability and susceptibil-
ity to the conjunction fallacy by category reinforcement; 
high-ability participants were less likely to be susceptible. 
In contrast, there was no significant relationship between 
ability and susceptibility to the causal conjunction fallacy. 
However, the latter finding is qualified by one significant 
result suggesting that high-ability participants were more 
likely to use causal knowledge to overcome part of the fal-
lacy and thereby rate the single close arguments stronger 
than the two-conclusion arguments.
How could a dual-process model account for the fact 
that ability affects reasoning about categorical, but not 
causal, relations? We consider three possibilities. (1) Rea-
soning about causal relations may be easier than reasoning 
about categorical relations, allowing both System 1 and 
System 2 to produce the normative answer for causal ma-
terials, but not for the category reinforcement materials. 
However, this does not account for the fact that there were 
even fewer normatively correct responses to causal mate-
rials than to category reinforcement materials. (2) Causal 
arguments elicited a stronger response from System 1, 
making the incorrect response more difficult for System 2 
to inhibit (see also Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & 
Evans, 2004; Moutier & Houdé, 2003). On this account, 
only very high-ability participants would be more likely 
to inhibit the incorrect response produced by System 1 
and respond based on the output of System 2. This would 
account for the slightly greater rate of nonnormative re-
sponding and for the weaker association with ability in 
causal cases. However, this account would appear to pre-
dict more nonnormative responding to the causal mate-
rials than we actually observed. (3) Reasoning based on 
causal knowledge is more difficult because of the need 
to integrate knowledge about the causal relations among 
categories with a representation of the probabilistic form 
of the problem. This would predict that the causal fallacy 
would be more difficult than the category reinforcement 
version, consistent with our results, and would also ac-
count for the association between ability and the tendency 
to use certain aspects of causal structure. However, this 
account appears to be at odds with previous dual process 
accounts, which claim that prior knowledge is not incor-
Figure 2. Mean differences between the strength ratings for the 
single- and two-conclusion arguments, collapsed across sets. Posi-
tive scores indicate a conjunction fallacy, whereas negative scores 
indicate that the single-conclusion argument was rated stronger 
than the two-conclusion argument. Asterisked bars differ signifi-
cantly from 0 (no difference).
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porated in decontextualized problem representations in 
System 2.
Our results also have implications for the relevance 
framework in category-based induction (Medin et al., 
2003). In the relevance framework, both conjunction falla-
cies are explained by claiming that the addition of a second 
conclusion category makes the common category or causal 
chain more available. Our findings suggest that, perhaps, 
their account holds for the category reinforcement materi-
als only. When reasoning about these materials, we think 
it likely that only the high-ability participants were able to 
resist the information about a common category that was 
more available when there were three categories in the 
argument. For the causal materials, however, we observed 
that the strongest ratings of argument strength were for the 
single close arguments. This suggests that the causal rela-
tionship was highly available when evaluating the single 
close arguments, even though there was just one category 
in the conclusion of those arguments.
In contrast with the typical conjunction fallacy, where 
one constituent category (feminist) is rated more probable 
than the conjunction, whereas the other is rated less prob-
able (bank teller), for the category reinforcement materials, 
we observed that low-ability participants rated the conjunc-
tion more probable than either of its constituents. This em-
phasizes the difference between the fallacy due to category 
reinforcement and the fallacy due to representativeness. 
In the category reinforcement version, information about 
the common category is most available when there are two 
categories in the conclusion. Certainly, these results sug-
gest that the category reinforcement effect does not occur 
because the premise category is more representative of one 
conclusion category than the other. In this sense, Medin 
et al.’s (2003) category reinforcement effect is different 
from other conjunction fallacies that have been reported.
In conclusion, we have replicated both of Medin et al.’s 
(2003) conjunction fallacies and shown that susceptibility 
to the category reinforcement fallacy—but not the causal 
fallacy—is associated with ability. The dual process ap-
proach assumes that differences in ability are causally re-
lated to susceptibility to these fallacies; but because our 
design was correlational, it is possible that other factors 
related to ability cause the observed differences. Future 
work using experimental designs should investigate this 
possibility. Nevertheless, our results support recent find-
ings suggesting that causal knowledge is particularly im-
portant for inductive reasoning (see Rehder, 2006; Reh-
der & Hastie, 2001; Shafto & Coley, 2003; Shafto, Kemp, 
Baraff, Coley, & Tenenbaum, 2005) and suggest that 
causal and categorical knowledge are treated differently 
in reasoning. More broadly, these results suggest that any 
complete theory of reasoning should address both how 
individual differences in cognitive ability and different 
kinds of prior knowledge affect reasoning.
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NOTE
1. There are two 65-item sections in the AH4, each administered 
in separate 10-min sessions. The first part contains verbal items con-
cerning direction, verbal opposites, numerical series, verbal analogies, 
simple arithmetic computations, and synonyms. The second part of the 
test contains diagrammatic items requiring judgments about analogies, 
sames, subtractions, series, and superimpositions. The test is scored 
by summing the raw scores from each of its component parts. Heim 
(1970) reported correlations between Parts 1 and 2 ranging from .60 to 
.81. Test–retest consistency and internal reliability for the AH4 are high 
(Alexopoulos, 1997; Heim, 1970). Correlations of .60 (Alexopoulos, 
1997) and .69 (Heim, 1970) have been found between the AH4 and 
Raven’s matrices.
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